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ABSTRACT 
Social Psychology sits at the confluence of two disciplinary discourses:  the psychology of 
sociological matters and the sociology of psychological processes. Of course these are not simply 
discourses but represent the entire disciplinary organisation of social psychology as a subject and 
what it counts as legitimate areas  of enquiry within its academic boundaries. These boundaries cut 
across the apparent divide between psychology and sociology, between the individual and the social, 
between the intra-psychic world and the world of human actions. However, this interdisciplinary 
appeal can also be considered as tapping into two broader discursive frameworks based upon the 
maintenance of an inner-outer dualism on the one hand and a rational and emotive dualism on the 
other. This chapter considers the way in which these discursive dualisms have given social 
psychology its raison d'être and its distinct dynamic and appeal as an academic subject. However, the 
recent turn to discourse within the discipline has not only provided it with the radical potential to 
study the construction and operation of these dualisms, but has also thrown into relief its 
interdisciplinary tensions again. This discourse on discourse involves a struggle for explanatory 
power in terms of either examining the ways in which psychological accounting is implicated in a 
flexible way as part of social practices at a ‘local’ level, or moving up an explanatory notch to a 
consideration of the operation of discourses on a  more deterministic ‘global’  level. The chapter 
concludes by considering this new discursive territory, rooted in social psychology’s origins.  
Keywords: cognitivism, discipline, discourse, dualism, interaction.  
1. INTRODUCTION
It was over a century ago in 1908 that two books were published that first bore the 
title ‘social psychology’. Although these books addressed social psychology, they did so in 
divergent ways that were to set the course of this academic area as a discipline , 
interdiscipline and eventually perhaps, a transdisciplinary endeavour. The Brit ish 
psychologist William McDougall in his book examined basic instincts and the emotions 
that accompany them. Whilst, his book has had little influence on modern social 
psychology, he nonetheless set out the course for psychological social psychology (PSP) as 
being concerned with explanation ‘down’ at the level of the indiv idual, including how 
people behave in relation to others. For example, McDougall sought to explore the nat ure 
of the gregarious instinct and how this is manifested in relation to others. In the same year 
sociologist Edward Ross published his book on social psychology which considered 
imitation and the mob mind. Th is book set the course for sociological social psychology 
(SSP) in terms of people’s behaviour and thought processes as the result of social 
interaction and in particu lar related to ‘social problems’. This has persisted over the ensuing 
century with topics such as rioting and violence attracting considerable research funding for 
social psychologists, and linked to seeking the means of social control.  
These psychological and sociological strands have remained largely distinct and 
segregated during the course of the past century. This twin focus on the s ocial and the 
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psychological has led to different disciplinary emphases as well as the creation of an 
interdisciplinary academic area which draws upon sociology and psychology, as well as 
other social scientific d isciplines. Social psychology straddles thes e two disciplines and, as 
such its raison d'être involves examining the ways in which both social and mental 
processes relate to people’s actions. What, precisely, this means however, remains a matter 
of historic debate both between and within the disciplines of psychology and sociology. 
What weight is to be given to the social, the psychological, and the interaction between the 
two? Is it the study of the psychology of sociological matters, or the sociology of 
psychological processes? These questions raise the issue of very different levels of 
explanation. 
In attempting to understand how people interact with one another and live their lives, 
psychologists are inclined to give greater attention to the notion of mental processes and 
characteristics of the person. They track back to the ‘inner’ world of the person, so to speak. 
Sociologists, on the other hand, are inclined to give greater attention to the social settings 
and social relations. Instead of focusing on the ‘inner workings’ of the person, sociological 
attention is directed toward action and meaning, to how people maintain or challenge the 
meaning of what they do through interaction. To put it another way, rather than assuming 
given characteristics of personhood, sociologists, start by looking at the ways in which we 
do society: how the interaction we engage in is shaped, and in turn shapes, the social order. 
Sociologically -inclined social psychologists are more likely to examine patterns of 
interaction in order to understand how social institutions, identities, and actions endure or 
change. Perhaps these differing perspectives are best explained by analogy based on an old 
joke: “A blind Venetian is not the same thing as a Venetian blind.” Social psychology can 
be different things and its location at the confluence of sociological and psychological 
concerns makes for considerable fluid ity of theory and methodology.  
2. THE DISCIPLINE OF PSP
The object of PSP is the individual mind. This is its explanatory patch, its academic 
territory. However, Howitt et al. (1989) point out that much of what is considered as social 
psychology is the leftover areas from its parent discipline of psychology. Areas such a 
developmental psychology, organisational psychology and clinical psychology all involve a 
great deal of social exp lanation but have carved out for themselves levels of explanation 
that arguably have a poorly developed inclusion of the ‘social’ in their theories and 
applications. However, it is the grip of cognitivism that has dominated PSP in terms of a 
focus on intra-psychic exp lanation of social behaviour. This focus has manifested itself in a 
concern with various forms of mental architecture or machinery  such as attitudes, 
attributional processes and social representations. Leaning in this direction has  placed 
social psychology very much within the mainstream concern with cognition but arguably at 
a cost of a poorly defined concept of where the social lies within social psychological 
explanation.  
This came to a head the in 1970s in what became known at the ‘crisis’ in social 
psychology. Social psychologists such as Gergen (1973) began to point to the historical 
dimension of what were considered as psychological universals. Alongside this there  
was a questioning of the role of experimentation and a recognition that social psychologists 
were operating within a disciplinary boundary that was stifling any concern with wider 
socio-political issues. However, in spite of some trenchant and hard-hitting critiques that 










to an intra-psychic level of exp lanation, for example in the notion of social representations 
(Moscovici, 1982; 1984).  
PSP has largely remained bound to a set of topics that have now become ossified as 
being the main concerns of social psychology. These are recognisable in many social 
psychology textbooks (e.g. attitudes, social influence, attribution, self-concept etc.).  
As noted above this collection of topics has come to define the ‘objects’ of social 
psychological investigation within psychology departments as well as being passed on to 
generations of undergraduate students. This is particularly the case in the USA where the 
connection between social psychology and sociology has become much weaker over the  
course of the past half century (Oishi, Kesebir, and Snyder, 2009). However, in contrast to 
this, there has been something of a revolution or more accurately evolution, especially in 
British PSP, that has taken place over the past couple of decades and that is the turn to 
discourse analysis and qualitative research. Much of this derives from the ‘other side’ of the 
disciplinary d ivide, SSP.  
  
3. THE DISCIPLINE OF SSP 
 
Mead (1934) is often credited with being the sociologist who most influenced the 
course of SSP, and it is interesting that his focus was the issue of symbolic representation, 
largely through language. This focus on the social nature of language and representation is 
a trademark feature SSP and sits in opposition to more psychological concerns with 
language as a window onto cognition. In this sense the contrast between the two approaches 
to social psychology is clear but there is, often as not, a space left in SSP for an assumed 
psychological architecture that mediates between the self and others in interaction. This can 
be seen, for example, the work of Parsons where the social actor is guided by internalised 
rules, roles and norms (Parson & Shils, 1951).  
However, this defining sociological concern with the nature of social order was to 
find later expression in the work of Goffman, but most important for later developments in 
SSP, in the Garfinkel’s project of ethonomethodology, and its offshoot in the form o f 
conversation analysis. This kind of approach differed markedly from PSP by drawing upon 
ethnographic accounts or an examination of the minutiae of conversational exchanges in 
‘naturalistic’ setting in order to show the nuanced and delicate procedures by which social 
order is constructed. This kind of approach was later imported as a kind of Trojan horse in 
PSP, notably in the seminal work of Potter & Wetherell (1987), Discourse and Social 
Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour. This kind of approach is addressed in more 
detail below but suffice to say that it has perhaps more than any approach to date gone 




As Weingart (2000) has observed, talk of interdisciplinarity is fraught with paradoxes 
and although social psychology can be considered an interdisciplinary field its parents still 
tug it in one direction or the other, as if they were engaged in the affections of their 
offspring after a divorce. Certain ly interdisciplinarity is often regarded as ‘desirable’ and is 
set in contrast to being overly specialised. However, the disciplinary organisation of 
sociology and psychology has generally meant that a genuine interdisciplinary approach to 
social psychology has proved elusive. This is unfortunate and has meant that social 
psychology has arguably suffered in terms of lacking an over-arch ing theoretical 










Moscovici (1982, 1984) in his attempt to make use of Durkheim and to theorize the notion 
of the ‘thinking society’.  
However, it is also apparent that social psychology has considerable scope to involve 
other disciplines such as anthropology, political science and linguistics. Each of these areas 
has contributed to some degree or other a more interdisciplinary form of social psychology. 
For example, the importance of culture has aided social psychology in providing a broader 
perspective on gender, whilst the inclusion of a political science perspective has helped in 
studying political persuasion and voting patterns. However, it is the turn to language where 
the greatest degree of cross-fertilisation has occurred, and it is to this area that I wish to turn 




Perhaps the most significant impact on social psychology over the past quarter of a 
century or so has been the turn to language. This is now constitutes a major body of work 
but again there are divisions that are rooted in social psychology’s project of linking 
whatever is taken to be the ‘social’ and the ‘ psychological’. Perhaps the most influential 
approach has been that of discursive psychology (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992) which has 
fed through into an impressive range of work on a variety of topics. This work is heavily 
influenced by conversation analysis and, as such, considers in detail the ways in which 
psychological discursive formulat ions are produced and oriented towards. This involves an 
agnostic stance with regard to the internal status of psychological phenomena. These 
psychological representations provide the means for a varied way of engaging in social and 
institutional life and a means of making it intelligible and orderly. Cognitive references to 
‘thinking’, giv ing ‘reasons’, ‘knowing’ ‘interpreting’ or ‘understanding’ provide publicly 
accountable criteria fo r agency. They provide both the means for ordering people’s lives as 
the basis for agency and a way for others to consider, judge and assess these act ions in the 
way that they are orientated towards in terms of duality of inner mind and external world.  
The emot ional basis for action that can be presented as understandable, as a means for 
literally moving a person to do something, or indeed for inaction. It is often portrayed as an 
influence on how people think, where thinking is taken as reasoning and emotion as 
providing a means of supporting this as in terms of action or as something that skews or 
bypasses the reasoning process. Reason implies stability and order in how people conduct 
themselves; unchecked emotion can be seen as threatening in terms of association with lack 
of order.  
This duality is interesting in terms of the ways in which  emotion discourse can be a 
flexib le and useful means of characterising action. As Edwards (1997) notes emotion 
discourse can be put to a great variety of uses within a range of social practices due to their 
flexib ility as an accounting resource:  
a. They can be contrasted with cognitions in terms of their less deliberat ive nature. 
b. They can be taken as being as ‘understandable’ and appropriate as how any 
reasonable person would react. 
c. They can be characterised as being the outcome of events or in the nature of the 
person. 
d. They can be treated as being kept under the control of a person’s reasoning or as 
reactions that resist control. 
e. They can be presented as the interaction of mental and physiological systems, as 










Studying participants’ orientations, either in terms of direct psychological accounting, 
or in terms of orientating towards aspects of the inner/outer dualism allows for a level of 
analysis in term of the study of the orderliness of social action. In this way a major cultural 
dualism is maintained: taking people’s ‘outward’ accounts and actions and considering 
these as representations of what they are like ‘inside’ as thinking and feeling agents. This 
derives from accountability within practices rather than as being taken as the result of some 
sort of inner mental cognitive processing and exchange of representations. 
The notion of these two separate realms is therefore a major rhetorical feature that is 
incorporated into how people interact with one another. It provides a means of trad ing on 
notions of ‘sense making’ as well as the portrayal of people’s inner’ mental states. There is 
a huge cultural imperative to be seen to be intellig ible and to be able to convey one’s 
‘thoughts’ and ‘feelings’ in the form of judgments, reasons, and evaluations as the outcome 
of some kind of mental process. In perceptual-cognitive p rocessing terms it is an  
“input-process-output” model.    
The nature of this order is therefore seen as being founded upon a discourse related to 
mental processes in order to account for how we perceive matters and as the basis for 
action. In this way events are placed prior to this operation, as having happened and 
needing to be communicated, to be ‘understood’ in terms of emotional response. In this 
communicat ion model there is a realm of people placed in amongst events and occurrences 
and a realm of mental operations requiring to be brought together. Here rationality is 
associated with the psychological notion of ‘perception’. Accounts of an about actions are 
presented as part of texts of ‘meaning’ in which a mental processing system is assumed to 
be brought to bear upon matters in order to display these as the result of psychological 
agents who reach ‘decisions’, have feelings, have deliberated on something or other or who 
have can account for something in a way that ‘make sense’ to others who can understand a 
course of action. It is interesting to note here how even accounts that allude to emotions as 
the basis for actions may nonetheless be treated as rational in terms of their accountabilit y 
or intelligib ility. We can see why a person might act in a particular way given certain 
circumstances and the way they react to and deal with these.   
By not starting with some pre-defined model o f the actor, especially the traditional 
cognitivist model in which the ‘problem’ becomes one of understanding how people 
perceive matters, it is becomes possible to treat ‘knowledge’ and ‘reality’ as cultural 
categories maintained or challenged within a range of social practices. The significance of 
such an analytical move is that it allows the focus of study to become how the relationship 
between ‘mind’ and ‘reality’ is not, for most people, some philosophical issue but a rather a 
practical sociological construction. Much has been written recently about the discu rsive 
means by which people construct such an association (e.g. Edwards & Potter, 1992; 
Edwards, 1997; Potter 1996; Potter & Edwards, 2001; Potter, 2003; te Molder & Potter, 
2005; Weatherall et al. , 2007). Potter (2012) perhaps best sums up this approach by 
referring to it as a more “naturalistic social psychology” that is rooted in everyday practices 
in which analyses are situated within the social, physical and institutional context of 
interaction. However, there is another stand of discursive work that attempts to examine 
these constructions in terms of structural constraints and issues of power and it is to this 
that I now wish to turn. 
Perhaps the most well know work in this area is associated with that of Parker  
(e.g. Parker & Burman, 1993; Parker; 1998). This work draws upon a Foucauldian notion 
of discourse and is seeking to examine d iscourse as linked to subjectivity and power. This 
form of discourse analysis is often subsumed under the broader heading of Critical Social 
Psychology. Now whilst this work has an explicit polit ical d imension it has been challenged 
for offering and overly determin istic explanation of discourse. Of course the counter to this 
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has been that the more conversation analytic inspired form of discourse analysis  has little to 
say about power. There has been some attempt to pull together both of these areas  
(e.g. Wetherell, 1998) but for the most part they have remained segregated. Parker (2013) 
has recently attempted to categorize different approaches to discours e analysis into eight 
different types; from the more conversation analytic end of the spectrum through to critical 
discourse analysis. This discourse on discourse analysis has itself attracted critique in terms 
of drawing boundaries and lines of demarcation between different approaches, as well as 
generating hierarchies of criticality (Augoustinos, 2013).  
However, there is another strand of work that can be thrown into the mix; those who 
argue that recent discourse work have failed to understand and grasp the significance of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. A key, proponent of this view is Coulter (2005) 
who brings to ethnomethodology a Wittgensteinian attention to the logical grammar of 
concepts and argues that conceptual analysis is invaluable in appreciat ing language use in 
logico-grammat ical terms. Language, as Coulter (2010) later argues, is not a system to be 
conceptualized in terms of a tripartite div ision between grammar, syntax and pragmatics but 
rather is a very much related to logico-grammatical usage in which the words themselves 
are self-sufficient. This approach is critical of the search for the psychological in discourse, 
imply ing that, far from eschewing mentalism, it is in fact a form of “closet Cartesianis m” 
(Sharrock, 2009). Neither does the sociological application of generalisations escape this 
critique, for as Sharrock and Dennis (2008) argue in examin ing the concept of 
rule-following, people may on occasion need rules explaining to them in order to 
understand a person’s actions, but they do not need how rules explain exp lained to them.  
Yet there are other approaches in social psychology that have also taken an 
alternative, and yet broad philosophical perspective in attempting to bridge 
socio-psychological analytical dualis m. Notable in this regard, is the work of Hwang 
(e.g., 2012, 2013, 2015a, 2015b) who has argued in favour of a culture -inclusive 
psychology base on a “one mind, many mentalit ies” (Shweder et al., 1998). In this 
approach the aim is therefore to formulate theories that represent what is considered as the 
universal nature of the human mind as well as the mentalit ies that derive from particular 
societies. The approach draws upon critical realism (Bashkar, 2008) and the analytical basis 
of the socio-psychological dualis m in seeking to bring together universal mechanism of the 
human mind with culture-inclusive theories on Confucianism. While this chapter is not the 
place to give a detailed explanation and critical appraisal of this approach, it worth pointing 
out the breadth and reach that it aspires in seeking to adopt multiple philosophical 
paradigms that offers alternatives to the mainstream presumption of individualism. 
This takes social psychology into new territories where it can act as a means of forging 
linkages between other philosophies, paradigms and cultural understandings. Indeed, to 
further shake up investigations the social psychological terrain, Shotter (2015) has recently 
argued, it is time to move beyond assuming and seeking after-the-fact patterns and 
regularit ies of pre-existing entities to thinking in terms of before-the-fact indeterminate and 
ephemeral things. In other words, to focus on humans deal routinely with the shaping of the 
‘thisnesses’ or ‘thatnesses’ of events in the course of interaction.  
What these kinds of different positions indicate is that social psychology can also be 
considered as a transdiscipline; a perspective that cuts across many other areas and 
disciplines (Scriven, 2008). It not only involves drawing on other disciplines but arguably 
these other disciplines seek to draw upon it, not as a disciplinary field, but rather as a 












This twin focus on discourse at the local as well as more global level is again part of 
the legacy of social psychology. The need to connect local actions with wider social fo rces 
is both at one and the same time social psychology’s strength as well as its problem. 
Although the recent turn to discourse has eschewed the atomism and indiv idualis m that was 
part of earlier work it has still thrown up issues of trying to connect how people act at a 
local level with a broader framework. Thus whilst discursive psychology is capable of 
showing how people orientate towards each other in their discourse as being driven by an 
internal machinery of mind, it offers little in the way of exp lain ing where this derives from.  
Those who adopt a broader exp lanatory framework in terms of the structural 
constraints of discourse fail to adequately offer a social psychology of action. Instead what 
we have is a very broad brush picture of how discourse operates. The origins of social 
psychology in both psychology and sociology effectively make this local/global split 
inevitable as it pulls in these different direct ions. This need not be a problem in the sense 
that this tension has kept social psychology as a thriving discourse and academic pursuit 
over the past century. Perhaps the challenge now is to consider social psychology not so 
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